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Abstract  
Institutional  innovations  are  increasingly  seen  as  key  to  achieving  not  only 
agricultural  growth,  by  overcoming  market  failures,  but  also  to  ensure  that  poor 
smallholders  also  benefit  from  this  process.  This  paper  analyses  institutional 
arrangements  for  vegetable  marketing  in  East  Africa  from  a  transaction  cost 
perspective. Marketing of vegetables is still dominated by spot markets with some, 
but still limited, movement towards farmers’ engaging collectively in contract farming 
through producers’ organisations. It appears that little is understood concerning how 
farmers and traders have overcome transaction costs in such situations, and this area 
deserves increased attention. An understanding of how institutional change occurs is 






   1 
1. Introduction 
Agriculture is receiving increasing attention as an instrument for growth, especially 
with  the  World  Development  Report  2008  (WDR)  titled  “Agriculture  for 
Development” (World Bank, 2007). In that report institutional innovations are seen as 
key to achieve not only agricultural growth, but also to include poor smallholders in 
this  growth.  These  institutional  innovations  are  expected  to  be  able  to  overcome 
various market failures, including missing or incomplete input and output markets, 
factor markets (including financial markets) and insurance markets. The Report sees a 
particular important role for the “third sector”—communities, collective action, and 
NGOs— in overcoming some of the market and state failures, with special attention 
for  producers’  organisations  (POs,  which  can  be  defined  as  an  agreement  among 
farmers to coordinate some activities, such as jointly purchasing inputs or delivering 
produce to clients) as fundamental to reducing transaction costs in markets, achieving 
market power and raising farmers’ voices in national and international policy forums. 
More pointedly, Dorward et al. (2005) argue that current emphasis in research and 
policy  discussions  on  the  institutional  environment  (such  as  property  rights, 
regulations,  policies,  informal  rules,  etc.)  in  Africa  is  at  the  expense  of  sufficient 
attention  to  institutional  arrangements.
1  They  call  for  more  investigation  of 
arrangements, especially for attention to those, such as producers’ organisations, that 
do not fit the textbook model of competition and exchange among atomised market 
players. 
In this paper we examine the case of institutional arrangements for marketing 
of farm produce in the vegetable sector of East Africa. Two alternative institutional 
arrangements for production and marketing of fresh vegetables can now be observed, 
next  to  the  ‘default’  option  for  most  farmers  of  spot  markets:  (i)  producers’ 
organisations (POs) and (ii) contract farming (or combinations of the two), which is 
important for high value, high quality crops (marketed to supermarkets and export 
markets). The principal research question addressed is how alternative organizational 
arrangements for marketing fresh vegetables in Kenya and Tanzania compare in terms 
                                                 
1 See also Kydd and Dorward (2004). The discussion here follows the same distinction between 
institutional arrangements (governance structures, formalised agreements, contractual arrangements 
between specific actors) and the institutional environment (the more general formal and informal rules 
mediating interaction) best associated with Williamson (2000) and building on the work of North 
(1990). See Figure 2 in the appendix.   2 
of  transaction  costs,  and  how  are  any  differences  related  to  characteristics  of  the 
product, market structure, supply chain, quality requirements or farmers. The larger 
aim  is  to  understand  how  changes  in  institutional  arrangements  come  about, 
particularly in the form of reduced transaction costs, and what is the potential for 
encouraging this process. Considerable attention of donors is being directed towards 
support of producers’ organisations. 
Aside from emphasis on innovations in institutional arrangements, the WDR 
does also acknowledge that the state is important in confronting the extensive market 
failures and uncertainties in agriculture, and concludes that an effective agriculture for 
development  requires  good  governance,  or  in  other  words  improvements  in  the 
institutional environment. In this paper, we are also interested then in how differences 
in transaction costs are related to the elements of the institutional environment such as 
property rights, contract law, and even informal norms, such as trust.  
Vegetable  production  constitutes  only  a  small  share  of  arable  land  in  East 
Africa. For Kenya this is 3%, Tanzania 6% and Uganda 1%. Over the past decade 
production has slightly increased according to official statistics, although it is difficult 
to assess their reliability (see Figure 1). Most of the production is for the local market 
and only part is exported, although exports seem to vary considerably across year. 
Export shares are highest for Kenya and rather low for Tanzania (FAOSTAT, 2007). 
Vegetables  include  many  different  crops,  with  some  that  are  mostly  for  local 
consumptions (such as cabbage, onion and tomato) and some that are more geared 
towards export markets (Scotch Bonnet pepper in Uganda) (Sonko et al., 2005). 
  The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  The  following  section  summarises  the 
general rationale for producers’ organisations and contract farming (as compared to 
spot markets), based on insights from transaction cost and supply chain economics. In 
the subsequent section, this theory is applied to vegetable marketing arrangements in 
East Africa. The concluding section summarises findings on how institutional change 
reduces transaction costs in fruits and vegetable chains in East Africa and identifies 
issues requiring further research. 
  Our paper can be seen as contributing to the research agenda identified at the 
most  general  level  for  the  agricultural  sector  by  Masten  (2000),  Ménard  and 
Valceschini  (2005),  and  Sykuta  and  Cook  (2001);  and  in  the  African  context  by   3 
Dorward et al. (2005). Relevant theoretical developments include those of Swinnen et 
al. (Swinnen et al.), as well as Fafchamps (2004) who underlines how little is known 
about the development of markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Figure 1: Production and export of vegetables (as share of total production in quantity terms) 
1990-2004 


























































































































Source: FAOSTAT | © FAO Statistics Division 2007 | 23 April 2007 
 
 
2. Organisational arrangements in marketing of agricultural products 
This section discusses the factors that affect the choice of institutional arrangements 
for  marketing  vegetables.  Drawing  on  the  insights  provided  by  new  institutional 
economics, these factors can be related to the configuration of transaction costs. We 
first  discuss  the  circumstances  under  which  producers’  organisations  (POs)  might 
reduce  transaction  costs  relative  to  individual  selling  in  spot  markets,  and  then 
examine a ‘hybrid’ form of governance (in Williamson’s language), contract farming 
including the combination where POs selling through contracts. 
The POs in both developed and developing countries has resulted in a long list 
of  services  that  a  PO  may  provide  to  their  members:  collecting,  sorting,  grading, 
processing,  logistics;  collecting  market  information;  credit;  bargaining;  innovation 
and knowledge transfer; establishing a quality assurance system; and risk sharing (see 
Bijman). Why would farmers set up a PO to carry out those services instead of just   4 
doing business with companies or individuals providing those services? There are a 
number of answers to these questions: 
-  Private companies may have an information advantage and are not willing to share 
this information with producers. In other words, private companies may not be 
trusted to act in the interest of the farmers. This could be seen as a case where 
there are high transaction costs due to asymmetric information. 
-  Private companies may not be willing to make investments that are specific to the 
relationship with a group of farmers. They are afraid that the farmers will take 
advantage of the dependency relationship that arises with specific investments. 
This could be seen as a case where there are high transaction costs due to asset 
specificity. 
-  Private companies may use their market power (e.g. when there is a oligopsonistic 
or monopsonistic market structure) to take a higher share of economic profits. 
-  Private companies cannot monitor contract compliance by the farmer, thus leaving 
room for opportunistic behaviour by the farmer. Again, this can be seen as a case 
where  there  are  high  transaction  costs  (such  as  risk  of  moral  hazard)  due  to 
asymmetric information. Only by reducing these costs through a PO can farmers 
offer a profitable opportunity to companies. 
-  Private companies may not be willing to provide insurance against particular risks. 
Thus farmers can reduce transaction costs by sharing risk. 
 
Taking these reasons for establishing a PO into account, we can address the 
question why POs may not be popular in the fresh produce industry. There are several 
explanations for this: 
-  Farmers may have alternatives that are sufficiently attractive: traders cannot afford 
to  behave  opportunistically  because  if  they  do,  the  farmers  will  no  longer  do 
business with them (market entry into the vegetable trading business is very easy). 
-  There  may  be  large  quality  differences  between  growers,  which  leads  to  the 
situation that farmers are unwilling to let others (the PO) do the negotiation for 
them. 
-  There are multiple market outlets for fresh produce. 
-  The scale of supply is not very important: many traders only buy small quantities.   5 
-  Because  personal  relationships  between  growers  and  traders  continue  to  be 
important, farmers do not easily change trading partners (traders may come from 
the same family, community, village). 
 
Institutional  change  occurs  and  POs  are  established  (in  the  fresh  produce 
industry) when warranted by specific (institutional) circumstances: 
-  when  few  alternative  market  outlets  are  available  and  collective  bargaining 
becomes more important; 
-  when scale is important, for instance when the buyer (exporter, retailer, processor) 
requires large quantities of homogeneous quality. In this case a PO can carry out 
the collection and sorting function; 
-  in the case of specialty products that require special handling for specific markets 
(e.g. branding); here the asset specificity argument becomes relevant; 
-  in the case of seasonal production in combination with year-round consumption. 
In this case farmers need to invest in storage, and probably would prefer to share 
market (i.e., price) risk; 
-  when there is a large information gap between sellers and buyers, for instance in 
production for export markets (asymmetric information argument); 
-  when farmers sell all of their produce in one transaction. 
 
Taking these reasons into account, we can identify what type of POs can be 
found in the vegetable industries of the developed countries. First of all, POs can 
function as auction cooperatives when the demand is larger than supply, for instance 
for high quality perishable seasonal products, like asparagus. Secondly, POs function 
as  bargaining associations in the case of products for the processing industry. And 
finally POs function as marketing associations, particularly for specialty products. 
The institutional arrangements discussed in the cases combine PO and contract 
farming. Contract farming seems to be growing in developing countries, because of a 
reduction in government procurement (previously handled by state marketing boards) 
and market regulation. Also promotion of exports leads to more contract farming, as 
production for high demanding export markets requires more vertical coordination   6 
between exporter and producers. This coordination, in terms of quantity and quality, 
cannot be obtained through spot markets. 
Contract  farming  is  an  institutional  arrangement  in  response  to  high 
transaction costs (or put differently: to market failure). Producers have difficulty to 
access inputs and to market their commodities while purchasers and processors may 
have  difficulty  obtaining  sufficient,  timely  and  qualitative  supplies.  For  contract 
farming to work, at least to work efficiently and somewhat equitably, the institutional 
environmental becomes important.  
Basically, POs can play two roles in facilitating contract farming. First, they 
can become part of the supply chain themselves by collecting, sorting, grading, etc of 
the products. Thus, they are actually organizing part of the supply chain activities. We 
have  seen this in  the  cases  discussed  above.  Second,  they  can  bargain  favourable 
terms with the contractor. In addition they can lobby the national government, and 
they  can  collect  information  on  markets  and  other  opportunities.  In  industrialised 
countries, POs that take up the first role are called cooperatives, while the POs that 
restrict their activities to negotiating are called bargaining associations. In the cases 
we discussed above, the POs did not take up these roles. The self-help group POs are 
probably too small and have a limited capacity to fulfil these roles, which can be 
explained by high search costs for possible alternative clients. 
The potential of contract farming is threatened by two main problem areas: 
farmer  default  on  contracts  and the  scale  of  farmer  operations.  Default  can  occur 
because of production failure or simply because farmers have sold the produce to 
competing buyers, partly to avoid repaying the credit and inputs they received as part 
of the contract. The weakness of formal institutions (e.g. legal system), the lack of 
collateral held by smallholders, and weak insurance systems, create considerable risk 
for companies entering into contracts. The scale of operation in smallholder farming is 
such that it leads to high transaction cost of ensuring quality and traceability, and 
auditing and monitoring many dispersed farmers. 
Coulter  et  al.  (1999)  state  that  POs  such  as  farmer  associations  and 
cooperatives can tackle both contract default and the scale of farmer operations. POs 
are used as an intermediary between farmers and contractor: the provision of inputs to 
the farmers is organized by the PO. Expensive monitoring of contract compliance is   7 
not  necessary  because  farmer  default  on  contract  is  reduced  through  the  social 
mechanisms  such  as  social  sanctions,  reputation,  and  common  norms,  which  are 
present in producer organisations. In other words, these informal institutions reduce 
transactions costs in the contractual arrangement. The problem of scale of operation is 
solved as the PO organizes the exchange of information, both the technical advice on 
production methods as well as other information farmers need to comply with quality 
requirements. 
3.    Institutional  arrangements  for  vegetable  chains  in  Uganda,  Kenya  and 
Tanzania 
This section analyses institutional arrangements for marketing of fresh vegetables in 
East Africa. The approach consists of applying the transaction cost framework to the 
growing literature on this sector, as well as from our own observations in the field in 
the course of related field research (including an interview held with a producers’ 
group in Maragua, Kenya in October 2006)
2. We proceed by first discussing spot 
market arrangements which are the most commonly observed and then move on to 
POs and their involvement in contract farming. In both cases, we discuss the likely 




For many farmers, spot markets constitute the default option for marketing their fruits 
and vegetables. Such market transactions remain the dominant allocation mechanism 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, not only for agricultural produce but for most commodities, 
and  they  are  much  more  important  than  allocations  through  hierarchies  such  as 
governmental organisations or within firms. In fact, the absence or weakness of those 
hierarchies may well be the reason why markets play such an important role in SSA 
(Fafchamps, 2004, p. 9). There is a difference between the theoretical definition of 
spot markets and spot markets that exist in many developing countries (Jaffee and 
Gordon, 1992). Evidence collected in Africa and elsewhere suggests that input and 
output markets, as well as factor markets (e.g. for labour or credit) are beset with 
                                                 
2 This is is being complemented by ongoing fieldwork (September 2007) in Tanzania which will be 
added to this paper.   8 
problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and contract enforcement problems that 
shape economic exchange and determine how efficient markets are (Bigsten et al., 
1999).  
The main actors in the vegetable chain are very similar for the three countries. 
Here the focus is on small-scale farmers who sell their surplus produce to rural traders 
(or collectors). Three different output markets can be discerned (Eskola, 2005)
3:  
￿  Local  village  markets:  the  farmers  themselves  bring  the  produce  to  nearby 
informal markets, which are often located near roads. The produce is often sold by 
women or children, who sell produce to an established circle of customers. These 
small  roadside  markets  usually  have  little  or  no  link  to  larger  markets  in  the 
region. 
￿  Regional markets: these have an important function for consumers as they are 
often the largest markets available to consumers in that region. Although some 
farmers may bring their produce to these markets, they are mostly dominated by 
traders, which can be divided into collectors, wholesalers and retailers.  
￿  National  markets:  these  are  usually  located  in  the  capital  city  and  can  be 
characterised  by  a  large  number  of  small-scale  producers  and  local  traders 
(wholesalers  and  retailers),  a  few  large-scale  traders  who  are  able  to  finance 
transport  and  marketing  costs.  The  national  market  provides  traders  with  an 
opportunity to expand their business. However, to do so, financial resources are 
required to buy and transport large quantities of goods. The export market for non-
traditional cashcrops (e.g. cashew) operates separately from the national markets 
for food crops. The traders operating in export markets are large-scale and usually 
foreign, have large financial resources, and considerable bargaining power relative 
to producers. 
Collectors purchase produce from farms and in some cases they help with 
harvesting the produce in order to meet targeted volumes (e.g. in Uganda (Sonko et 
al., 2005)). Farmers have little influence in setting prices and usually accept the price 
the rural traders offer. As was outlined above, relational contracting makes it difficult 
to switch partners (e.g. due to search costs) and for farmers to have a more or less 
                                                 
3 The export market is usually limited to non-traditional crops which have a limited market. The cross-
border trade with neighbouring countries can be an important source of livelihood for communities 
living near border, but the traditional exports constitute only a small amount of total export earnings in 
the country.   9 
assured outlet for their produce is apparently more important than obtaining a higher 
price. Or, put differently, the transaction costs of obtaining a higher price are too high. 
The rural traders fulfil various functions. The most important function that we found 
was that they transport the collected produce and bring it to various (local) markets. 
But they may also be involved in grading, financing, or selling consumer goods. At 
the market, they either fulfil the function of wholesaler or sell it to wholesalers in the 
market.  Transporters  sometimes  come  in  when  rural  traders  cannot  organise  the 
transport themselves. Rural traders may be small-scale operations and have no means 
to use trucks, instead either using other means (bicycles or motorcycles) or hiring 
transporters. 
Wholesalers buy produce from the rural traders and directly sometimes from 
the producers and sell it on to retailers who stock small quantities mainly due to the 
limited demand among consumers. Wholesalers have a right to a certain market spot
4. 
This right can be formal when they are assigned a spot by the market authority and 
pay  for  it  or  informally  when  no  such  arrangement  is  made  with  official  market 
authorities, although an informal agreement may have been struck with other traders 
to  share  space  in  an  unauthorized  location  (e.g.  next  to  the  market  facilities).  In 
Tanzania, the traders must register to be granted permission to trade at the markets. 
They pay a daily fee to the market authority for cleaning and security. There is a 
variety  of  traders  with  respect  to  size  of  business  (from  small-scale  to  large).  In 
Tanzania, large traders have a wider geographical reach and a higher turnover (US$ 
30-90 per day). Medium-scale traders buy their produce mainly from local producers 
and  trade  a  limited  number  of  goods.  Turnover  is  around  US$  20  per  day.  Their 
working capital is sufficient to run the business but is not sufficient to finance the 
transport cost or purchase large quantities of goods from other regions. Their business 
knowledge is weaker than the large-scale traders (e.g. they are unable to carry out 
bookkeeping). Small-scale traders are often very poor and have no other means of 
income. They are often landless, have no means of transport and are unable to give 
credit or receive it (due to their difficulties of paying back). Trading gives them a very 
small income (their turnover is around US$ 4.5 per day) (Eskola, 2005). 
                                                 
4 These are usually open air markets operated under license of local municipal governments and 
sometimes referred to as “wet markets” (Bear et al., 2005).   10 
Wholesalers also have (established) contacts with rural collectors and traders 
and retailers. Eskola (2005) reports that even large traders are unlikely to move from 
the regional markets into national markets even for marginally higher profit because 
they are committed to serving the existing base of customers. This commitment is 
usually social rather than economic, and the loyalty to customers, friends and relatives 
is  more  important  than  the  “short-term  opportunistic  profits  available  in  other 
markets”.  
Traders  sometimes  receive  credit  from  producers  (i.e.  pay  for  the  produce 
later)  and  give  credit  to  their  customers  (i.e.  receive  payments  for  produce  later) 
(Eskola, 2005; Sonko et al., 2005). This is interesting, as in other regions such as 
Java, the traders give credit to producers to buy inputs and collect the credit plus 
interest when the farmer sells the produce (Meijerink, 2002). It seems that especially 
the small traders are financially constrained. All market participants have difficulties 
in  overcoming  problems  related  to  fluctuating  prices  and  supply  of  fruits  and 
vegetables. During the season there is oversupply and prices drop. Consumers profit 
from  this  situation,  but  especially  the  farmers  and  to  some  extent  the  traders  are 
disadvantaged.  Outside  the  season  there  is  hardly  any  supply  and  prices  rise. 
Consumers are disadvantaged by this as well as traders, who are unable to specialise 
in a few products. Traders are disadvantaged also by transport problems, which can be 
irregular. For fruits and vegetables it is important to transport the produce quickly. 
Transport problems affect especially large traders who transport produce over large 
distances.  
Brokers are traders who do not have a place on the physical market (i.e. do not 
own  a  stall).  Nyoro  et  al.  (2004)  find  for  Kenya  that  supermarkets,  hotels  and 
hospitals prefer increasingly to buy from brokers instead of from wholesale markets. 
These  wholesale    markets  are  often  characterised  by  poor  hygiene  and  sanitation, 
safety and lack of traceability of commodities. Brokers source their produce from 
various sources including farmers, wholesale markets and sometimes imports.  
 
Transaction costs 
The price that farmers can get in the wholesale markets is (much) higher than they get 
from the collector. Farmers are price takers and have little bargaining power. This   11 
begs the question what they can do to get a higher price. What we find is that their 
options  are  limited  due  to  high  transaction  costs.  The  possibility  of  selling  their 
produce  to  wholesalers  or  even  retailers  encounters  various  problems,  in  the  first 
instance, transport. Contacts are a second problem: their only contact is often with the 
collectors/rural trader. Markets in SSA are characterised by relational exchange: firms 
economize on screening incompetent partners by establishing long-term relationships 
with other firms they have learnt to trust. However, relational contracting makes it 
costly for firms to switch partners. If one of the partners is temporarily unable to 
perform, this will not lead to harsh punishment or breach of contract (ending the 
relationship) because the search costs for a new partner are too high. It is therefore in 
the  interest  of  the  two  parties  to  work  things  out  until  the  difficulty  is  over 
(Fafchamps,  1996).  Finding  another  trading  partner  involves  transaction  costs  and 
may not lead to obtaining a higher price: other collectors/rural traders will probably 
offer  the  same  price.  We  found  anecdotal  evidence  in  Java  that  wholesalers  will 
recognise  inexperienced  farmers  in  the  market,  then  offering  them  prices  that  are 
much lower (Meijerink, 2002). Becoming an “experienced” seller takes time, and it is 
necessary to build up relationships. Selling to the collector with whom the farmer has 
an  established  contact,  leads  at  least  to  a  more  or  less  assured  output  market. 
“Shopping around” for other traders may jeopardise this, as supply often outstrips 
demand.  
Although  most  of  the  fruits  and  vegetables  trade  is  executed  through  spot 
markets, the transaction costs in these markets are very high. Transaction costs are 
also high because fruits and vegetables are perishable products, and therefore cannot 
be stored until sufficient information on qualitative and quantitative demand has been 
obtained. Various institutional arrangements could potentially lower these transaction 
costs, although finding the right model is not easy. The Business Services Market 
Development  project  has  tried  to  introduce  formal  contract  templates  to  facilitate 
business in various fruits and vegetables in Uganda (AT Uganda Ltd et al., 2005). 
They  found  that  for  small-scale  using  contracts  will  not  always  lower  transaction 
costs. In general, the markets are thin and prices are volatile and uncertain. Farmer 
supply only very small quantities and have no market power and can therefore not 
determine the terms of the contract. Traders on the other hand, are generally unable or 
unwilling to commit to prices and quantities in advance. Furthermore contracts were   12 
seen as complicated and costly; neither traders nor farmers understand the language 
used in contracts, and both thus lack the knowledge of how to formulate one. 
Organising  themselves  into  a  producers’  organisation  (PO)  may  help  to 
overcome some of these problems. Looking at the lack of access to the different kinds 
of  capital (see  Error! Reference  source  not  found.),  POs  can  provide  solutions. 
Jointly  farmers  can  organize  activities/investments  that  they  cannot  do  alone,  e.g. 
jointly own logistic assets (trucks, warehouses); set up a credit cooperative; hire a 
technical assistant; and set up an irrigation system. In addition, the PO can lobby 
local, regional and national governments to improve public services (thus reducing 
government failure) or to enact favourable regulations. Another important function of 
the  PO  is  collecting  market  information  and  sharing  this  information  with  the 
members. Thus, POs can reduce transaction costs in the farmer-customer relationship.  
However,  organising  themselves  into  a  PO  also  involves  transaction  costs. 
Becoming a member of a PO introduces some kind of dependency on the group; if a 
member  of  the  group  behaves  opportunistically,  all  other  members  are  negatively 
affected. Social capital can alleviate this problem. Also, becoming a member of a PO, 
with it compulsory trade, may exclude more attractive market opportunities. Thus 
members have to consider short term and long term benefits/costs. 
Brokers exist because of informational transaction costs in the markets – they 
bring together supply and demand from various sources. By doing so they reduce 
transaction costs. They might also facilitate transport, but not necessarily.  
 
Institutional environment 
As indicated above, the spot market is the default marketing option for farmers. The 
spot  market  is  characterised  by  the  absence  or  weakness  of  the  institutional 
environment in various areas. One of the formal institutions that may be functioning is 
a physical market place, such as a building, and an organisation setting the rules of 
participation (such as allocating vendor permits and lots, perhaps including limitations 
on the specific products). It may also be the case that this kind of formal market 
organisation enforces other formal rules, such as those concerning sanitary standards, 
or quality grading.   13 
Transport costs consisting of fuel, hiring a truck etc. are not part of transaction 
costs (although they are often mentioned as such). In Tanzania, for instance, there are 
transaction  costs  attached  to  transport  emanating  from  road  blocks  that  consist  of 
weigh stations to control trucks for permitted limits to the load they are carrying as 
well as illegitimate controls by police for bribes. A third effect is the presence of 
armed robbers along transport routes. Sometimes transporters will take along guards, 
adding  to  the  transport  costs  (Eskola,  2005).  The  delays  emanating  from  these 
problems can cause the produce to deteriorate, adding to the costs of transport. 
The  lack  of  a  well-functioning  legal  system  also  affects  the  agreements 
between buyers and sellers. As was identified above, this is why informal rules play 
such an important role in spot markets. If there is a dispute, the parties usually do not 
take  recourse  to  legal  action,  because  the  transaction  costs  of  this  are  too  high. 
However, it is reported that in Uganda there were a few cases where farmers and or 
traders did pursue legal options and turned to the Local Council Courts. The law 
permits these courts to handle only cases where the value of the subject matter does 
not  exceed  USh  5000  or  around  US$  3,  while  the  sums  involved  in  disputes  are 
usually higher (AT Uganda Ltd et al., 2005). 
Missing  markets  for  financial  services  constrain  farmers  from  investing  in 
profitable  fruits  and  vegetable  production.  Minot  and  Ngigi  (2004)  report  in their 
Kenyan study that several farmers indicated that without adequate working capital 
they are not able to plant crops on a weekly basis, which is essential for a continuous 
flow of produce. And they often lack the capital to invest in irrigation (e.g. pumps) 
which is usually necessary to grow fruits and vegetables. 
Informal  rules  play  an  important  role  in  spot  markets.  Spot  markets  may 
function in the absence of a well-established institutional environment of formal rules. 
Contracts between farmers and rural traders are informal, based on verbal agreements. 
In the case of a conflict, the transaction costs of resorting to formal institutions (such 
as the police, courts) are usually higher than the costs involved in the dispute, because 
the  transactions  are  usually  small.  And  as  observed  above,  the  loss  of  a  trade 
relationship involves high costs because investing in a new one takes a ling time. 
Introducing formal contract as a way to decrease transaction costs in Uganda did not 
fit into the informal rules based on trust. The researchers found that there was little 
initial felt need for contracts because farmers and traders felt that exchange without   14 
contracts was the norm: “this is the way it has always been done” (AT Uganda Ltd et 
al., 2005, p. 1). In the Ugandan setting, asking for a contract is interpreted to meant 
hat you do not trust the other party and can be taken as an insult. The informal rules 
based on trust and reciprocity thus override the potential gain of using formal rules 
such as contracts. 
Contract farming through producer organisations 
Contract farming refers to a range of initiatives taken by private agribusiness firms to 
secure access to produce. Companies provide services to farmers and in return receive 
access to some or all of the farmers’ produce. Schemes typically involve the provision 
of inputs (seed, fertilisers, pesticides) on credit, often with extension advice, but may 
also include a range of other services such as ploughing and crop spraying. Costs are 
recouped when the produce is sold.  
It is interesting to note that POs are only observed for vegetable marketing in 
combination  with  contract  farming.  Although  POs  could  potentially  exist  without 
contract farming, i.e. marketing fruits and vegetables for the local, regional or national 
markets, we have not found examples of these. Similarly, contract farming could be 
on the basis on individual farmers, without PO, but apparently, the combination is 
preferred by both producers and contractors. The reasons for this will be discussed 
below.  
In Kenya various “self-help” groups exist, with varying (economic) goals
5, but 
contract farming is one of these. These self help groups are encouraged by the District 
Departments  of  Social  Services  (DSS)  and  are  formed  by  farmers  themselves  by 
registering at the DSS. Some such groups are formed to establish a type of PO to pool 
their produce and establish contractual market arrangements with an exporter, thereby 
eliminating brokers. This will offer a reliable market outlet and higher prices. The 
contract  specifies  the  quantity  and  type  (including  quality,  grading  and  packaging 
requirements) of produce that the self-help group will supply weekly to the exporter. 
The degree of support the exporter provides differs. In Kathiriti-Kanjau the exporter 
supplied the seed on credit and guarantees to buy the entire production. The exporter 
also  provided  training  to  a  supervisor,  while  the  group  paid  for  transport  and 
                                                 
5 This section is based on the cases described by Minot and Ngigi for Kathiriti-Kanjau, in Kenya 
(Minot and Ngigi, 2004) and research (semi-structured interviewing) undertaken in October 2006 by 
Gerdien Meijerink in Maragua.   15 
subsistence.  The  supervisor  was  involved  to  supervise  and  monitor  production 
practices of group members to ensure that they would adhere to production methods 
prescribed  by  the  exporter  (including  chemical  use  and  sanitary  conditions).  In 
Maragua, The exporter paid for a farmer to be trained in sorting, weighing, grading 
and packaging so that the graded produce could be transported to the exporter. The 
exporter  did  not  however  provide  credit.  The  group  in  Maragua  had  difficulty  in 
meeting the quota set by the exporter and tried to interest farmers in neighbouring 
villages  to  join  their  group.  A  group  member  who  consistently  fails  to  fulfil  the 
quantity  and  quality  standards  risks  being  excluded,  thus  losing  the  substantial 
income. The farmers complained about the lack of working capital to buy seeds to 
keep up a continuous flow of produce.  
The group in Maragua reported that they had organised themselves formally. 
The group had voted in a steering committee consisting of a group leader, secretary 
and treasurer. The group leader was the one who had initiated the group and had 
contacted the exporter. All members had agreed to the terms of the self-help group, 
which included agreements on supplying produce by and payments to each member. 
The generally higher level of social capital observed among Kenyan POs that are 
participating in contract farming arrangements may imply challenges for initiatives 
that seek to facilitate the participation of poorer smallholders in higher-value market 
segments, such as cultivation of vegetables for supermarkets or export markets.  
We have less information on the exporters, but Temu & Temu (2005) indicate 
that the long-term market linkages between exporters and importers indicate a high 
degree of social capital. Sometimes exporters and importers work closely to ensure 
quality and reliable production.  
 
Transaction costs 
The  self-help  groups  have  overcome  specific  transaction  costs  that  exist  in  spot 
markets.  By collectively agreeing to fulfil a purchasers' orders, members of a PO 
reduce  the  costs  of  transacting  for  both  themselves  (sharing  the  costs  of  contact, 
contract and control) and the contractor, for whom  many smaller contracts would 
incur too many costs and who is not able to adopt measures that would reduce the risk   16 
that individual producers might not meet quantity or quality requirements. Contracting 
with a PO therefore reduces the risk of moral hazard due to asymmetric information.  
Furthermore, by pooling produce PO members can engage in contract farming 
and bypass traders. The exporter is the source of information on prices, grades and 
standards. For the exporter, the transaction costs of contracting a group are clearly 
lower (on a per unit purchased basis) than for contracting individual farmers. The 
farmers’  group  in  Kathiriti-Kanjau  complained  though  that  the  exporter  did  not 
conduct grading in the field and they were concerned that the exporter may be using 
the  grading  to  pass  market  risk  and  uncertainty  to  the  farmer.  There  is  thus 
information asymmetry (which can be seen in Table 2).  
 
Institutional environment 
For the farmers, the overall institutional environment is similar as the one described 
under spot markets, but there do appear to be differences between the three countries. 
In  Kenya,  the  Department  of  Social  Services  has  played  an  encouraging  role  by 
allowing self-help groups to form and register. The DSS also gives training to form 
credit associations (“merry-go-round”) to enable farmers to pool savings and derive 
credit from these. Many gaps in the institutional environment are overcome by the 
exporter, such as grading and standards. Farmers have information on the quantity and 
quality requirements they need to meet. However, information asymmetries may put 
farmers at a disadvantage in the bargaining relationship with the exporter, allowing 
the latter to capture a larger share of any economic rents.  
For the exporters, in Kenya the marketing of vegetables has been generally 
free of direct government interventions, and confined to regulatory and facilitative 
functions which has enabled the remarkable success of the industry (Minot and Ngigi, 
2004). The Horticultural Crop Development Authority (HCDA)
6, established in 1967, 
has played a facilitating role. The HCDA is a governmental parastatal which in the 
first years was actively involved in marketing. Nowadays, however, it has withdrawn 
from  marketing  activities  and  leaves  this  to  the  private  sector,  aiming  instead  to 
facilitate the development of horticultural crops, partly by licensing exporters and 
disseminating information on horticultural marketing and production practices (e.g. by 
                                                 
6 Information available at http://www.hcda.or.ke/   17 
providing a list of banned pesticides). The HCDA also provides code of conduct (i.e. 
contractual specifications) to be adhered to by the exporter and outgrowers’ groups 
(such as the self-help groups). There is no legal enforcement mechanism for this code 
of conduct, but with Euregap requirement of the EU as of January 2005, it is likely 
that exporters will adhere to the standards (Nyoro et al., 2004).   
While  the  Ugandan  fruit  and  vegetable  sector  has  also  been  freed  of 
government interventions, as the government has liberalised agricultural input and 
output markets in general over the past two decades (Sonko et al., 2005), the type of 
supportive role played by the HCDA has generally been absent. Tanzania appears, on 
the  other  hand,  to  have  maintained  a  more  prescriptive  or  dirigiste  regulatory 
environment for POs and agricultural marketing in general. These differences in the 
institutional environment (in particular, government regulations, as well as specific 
initiatives) may partly explain the relative scarcity of POs in contract farming for 
vegetables and fruits in those two countries, but more detailed research is necessary.  
In the cases discussed above, the contractor and members of the PO invested 
in training so that the PO could assume the functions of exchanging information on 
quality requirements. Coulter et al. (1999) also provide an interesting example of the 
informational  link  between  PO  and  contract  farming:  “In  the  outgrower  schemes 
promoted by the Fresh Produce Exporters’ Association of Kenya (FPEAK), farmers 
are organised in small groups of 15 to 20 to obtain information, inputs, and technical 
and quality assistance.”  
The combination of POs and contract farming seems to be found especially in 
Kenya. Kenya has experienced a long and sustained growth of its horticultural sector 
since independence (Minot and Ngigi, 2004). One of the reasons for this has been the 
fact  that  the  institutional  environment  in  Kenya  has  enabled  the  private  sector  to 
undertake investments without fear of regulation (Wiersinga and De Jager, 2007). 
This, in combination with the support from the Kenyan Department of Social Services 
to facilitate the establishment and registration of “self-help groups” has led to the 
formation of producers’ organisations for fruits and vegetable marketing, which are 
conspicuously lacking in Tanzania and Uganda. 
 
4. Conclusion   18 
The analysis contributes to understanding why certain institutional arrangements exist 
and why alternatives (fail to) develop. In the examples we highlighted, the framework 
enabled  us  to  develop  some  understanding  of  the  prevalence  of  spot  markets  (as 
predicted by Swinnen et al. 2007), and the failure of producers’ organisations to arise 
in the fresh fruits and vegetable value chains, without complementary institutional 
arrangements  such  as  contract  farming.  These  institutional  arrangements  lower 
transaction costs and it appears that the institutional environment may also play a key 
role in determining the potential for this economising to take place. 
The  dominance  of  spot  markets  to  sell  vegetables  (and  fruits)  begs  the 
question why no other institutional arrangements are used by small-scale farmers to 
lower transaction costs or to command a higher price. For instance, why do we do not 
find many POs in the fresh produce industry of developing countries? The premise 
used in this paper is that the transaction costs of other institutional arrangements are 
apparently higher than those of the spot market. But which factors seem to play a key 
role in this? 
This  paper  constitutes  a  first  attempt  at  understanding  institutional 
arrangements in the vegetable sector in East Africa. Several questions are still open 
for further investigation. For instance, there is little information on how farmers in 
contract farming have overcome transaction costs related to contact. How were the 
relations with the exporters established? What role did social capital and trust play in 
this? Are poorer farmers likely to be excluded from participation in such schemes? 
What  is  the  potential  to  stimulate  the  development  of  these  new  institutional 
arrangements? With the illustrative material presented here, we have only scratched 
the surface of what can be done. The next step is to apply the framework to specific 
in-depth case studies, in a comparative fashion, in order to develop more sophisticated 
and robust insights into these issues. 
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Figure 2: Different levels and components of institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 